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Remedies for Anticipatory Breach of Contract
with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: A
Comparison of Legal Regimes
Ronen Avraham and Zhiyong Lin
Abstract
The Law and economics movement has paid a lot of attention to carefully ana-
lyzing various doctrines of contract law. Yet, with few exceptions, the doctrine of
anticipatory breach seems to have escaped law and economics scholars’ scrutiny.
Specifically, the question of optimal choice of remedies has escaped scholars’
eyes. While traditionally in England the party who files a law suit can get only
damages, in the US the party can not only ask for assurances for performance,
but also, in appropriate cases, get specific performance. Which regime is better?
Can parties opt in and out of those regimes? Is there a legal regime which is su-
perior to both the English and American regimes? In this paper we attempt to
start filling in this gap by studying the relationship between various regimes of
remedies. Specifically, we start by studying the conditions in which the Ameri-
can legal regime (which grants the non-breaching party an option to choose, in
appropriate cases, between specific performance and actual damages) is superior
to the English regime (which allows the non-breaching party to seek only actual
damages). We then explore a third regime, which as far as we know does not exist,
and show that it is unconditionally Pareto Superior to both the English and Amer-
ican legal regimes. Our analysis in this paper informs transactional lawyers of
the relevant economic factors they should consider when deciding between reme-
dies in a given anticipatory breach context. We focus on the ex-ante design of
the contract in light of new and asymmetric information that the parties anticipate
they will gain after they draft the contract. We assume fist, for simplicity, that
no renegotiation or investments are involved. We demonstrate the optimal way to
design contract clauses which takes advantage of the information that the seller
and the buyer receive between the time they enter into the contract and the time
of the breach. We present two models. One is for non-market goods and the other
is for market-goods. The law is different with respect to the way damages are cal-
culated for these two classes of goods. We thus model both types of transactions.
Section two describes the legal background against which we have designed our
models. Section three surveys the literature that evaluates contract remedies in
the context of anticipatory breach context from an economic perspective. Section
four presents two simple models with incomplete two-sided asymmetric informa-
tion. In section four, we compare the performance of the American legal regime
with that of the English one. Section five discusses some interesting extensions
meant to approach the first-best allocative efficiency. The appendix provides a
more rigorous mathematical demonstration of the model.
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1. Introduction 
The Law and economics movement has paid a lot of attention to carefully 
analyzing various doctrines of contract law. Yet, with few exceptions, the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach seems to have escaped law and economics scholars’ scrutiny.1 
Specifically, the question of optimal choice of remedies has escaped scholars’ eyes.  
While traditionally in England the party who files a law suit can get only damages, in the 
US the party can not only ask for assurances for performance, but also, in appropriate 
cases, get specific performance. Which regime is better? Can parties opt in and out of 
those regimes? Is there a legal regime which is superior to both the English and American 
regimes?  
In this paper we attempt to start filling in this gap by studying the relationship 
between various regimes of remedies. Specifically, we start by studying the conditions in 
which the American legal regime (which grants the non-breaching party an option to 
choose, in appropriate cases, between specific performance and actual damages) is 
superior to the English regime (which allows the non-breaching party to seek only actual 
damages). We then explore a third regime, which as far as we know does not exist, and 
show that it is unconditionally Pareto Superior to both the English and American legal 
regimes.  
Our analysis in this paper informs transactional lawyers of the relevant economic 
factors they should consider when deciding between remedies in a given anticipatory 
breach context.  
We focus on the ex-ante design of the contract in light of new and asymmetric 
information that the parties anticipate they will gain after they draft the contract. We 
assume fist, for simplicity, that no renegotiation or investments are involved.2 We 
demonstrate the optimal way to design contract clauses which takes advantage of the 
information that the seller and the buyer receive between the time they enter into the 
contract and the time of the breach. 
We present two models. One is for non-market goods and the other is for market-
goods. The law is different with respect to the way damages are calculated for these two 
                                                 
1 Exceptions are Jackson (1978), Mahoney (1995), Triantis (2003) and Triantis & Triantis (1998).   
2 Indeed, in an environment of asymmetric information renegotiation costs are high. More on renegotiation 
below in footnote 26.  
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classes of goods. We thus model both types of transactions. Section two describes the 
legal background against which we have designed our models. Section three surveys the 
literature that evaluates contract remedies in the context of anticipatory breach context 
from an economic perspective. Section four presents two simple models with incomplete 
two-sided asymmetric information. In section four, we compare the performance of the 
American legal regime with that of the English one. Section five discusses some 
interesting extensions meant to approach the first-best allocative efficiency. The appendix 
provides a more rigorous mathematical demonstration of the model.  
 
2. The Law of Anticipatory Breach.  
 
Anticipatory breach is a relatively recent development in the Anglo-American 
law.3 As Corbin puts it: “An anticipatory breach of contract by a promisor is a 
repudiation of his contractual duty before the time fixed in the contract for his 
performance has arrived.”4  While traditionally one could not get a remedy before the 
actual time of performance, in the mid 19th century courts in England and later in 
America did start granting some kind of remedy before the time of performance.   
Section 2-610 of the UCC provides the aggrieved party with two main options in 
case of repudiation. First, the aggrieved party can “for a commercially reasonable time 
await performance” and urge the repudiating party to retract from the repudiation. She 
may ask for reasonable assurances of performance during this time. Second, the buyer 
can resort to remedies stipulated in section 2-711 (even if the buyer has notified the 
repudiating party that he would wait.5 Under the remedies stipulated in section 2-711, the 
buyer may cancel the contract (and refrain from paying the price not yet paid). Whether 
or not the buyer has cancelled the contract she may choose from several courses of 
conduct.  Her options depend on the type of goods in question, as the UCC distinguishes 
at this stage between cases where the goods are traded in the markets and therefore have 
readily available market prices, and cases where the goods are unique. If the goods are 
                                                 
3 The leading case is Hochster v. de la Tour, 118 Eng Rep. 922 (Q.B 1853).  
4 9-54 Corbin on Contracts § 959 
5 UCC 2-610. The aggrieved party can also suspend her own performance. We ignore this possibility here 
as we assume, for simplicity, that the only obligation the buyer has is to pay the contract price. For the 
same reason we ignore the remedies set forth in section 2-703, as they refer to seller’s remedies.  
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not unique, the buyer may choose to “cover,” i.e. to make a reasonable purchase of goods 
in substitution for those due from the seller. Alternatively, the buyer can recover damages 
for non-delivery as provided in section 2-713 and 2-723. For goods that have a market 
price, the damages would be based on the difference between the market price and the 
contract price.6  
If the goods are unique, the buyer can, in appropriate cases, get specific 
performance. Alternatively, she could choose to recover damages for non-delivery. As 
there is no readily available market price, the UCC allows the parties to use any other 
reasonable method of measuring damages, provided that they have given the other parties 
fair notice about it.7  
In sum, under the UCC, there are two different types of processes. If the goods 
have a readily available market price, then the buyer can choose to “cover” or “recover.” 
From an economic standpoint, as is made clear below, because the calculation of the 
damages is straight forward, both options are equivalent.8 If the goods do not have a 
readily available price, then the buyer will need to prove her loss in court--not a trivial 
task. Whether or not it is easy to prove damages, the buyer can ask the seller to provide 
her with assurances that the seller will perform, and, in appropriate cases, can even get a 
decree of specific performance from the court.  
The doctrine of anticipatory breach in England is very similar.9 The only 
difference is that the buyer cannot get specific performance. This difference between the 
English legal regime and the American legal regime is interesting.  Why? We thus 
develop simple models that compare the efficiency of both legal regimes. We offer two 
different models to deal with the two types of goods-- those which do, and those which 
do not-- have readily available market prices.  
                                                 
6 If there is no evidence of a market price prevailing, then parties can bring evidence of a price reasonable 
before or after the time of the repudiation, or at any other market place which is a reasonable substitute   
There is a debate in the literature regarding the exact time the market price should be looked at. Section 2-
723 mentions the “time when the aggrieved party learned of the repudiation”. Some have argued that the 
relevant time is the time of the original performance. JJ White and Robert Summers, Uniform Commercial 
Code. We ignore this debate at this point.  
7 USS 2-723 and official comments.  
8 A buyer’s decision whether to “cover” or “recover” will be based on the transaction costs involved in each 
case. We ignore this aspect in this paper.  
9 See Chitty on Contracts, (Volume 1, General Principles) (London, 2004) at 1383. See also The Law of 
Contract (Michel Furmston, Ed), 2nd edition, at 435.  
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3. Related Literature  
          
In this section we survey previous related work and distinguish our work  
 
[To be Completed] 
 
4. A model of anticipatory breach- goods with no readily available price.  
 
4.1The setting.  
 
At Time 1 a seller-supplier and a buyer-manufacturer (both are risk-neutral) enter 
a contract for the sale of a single unit of indivisible goods that the buyer-manufacturer 
needs for its production of the finished goods. The seller receives the money upon 
performance, that is, when he supplies the good sometime in the future10. There is 
uncertainty about seller’s cost of production due to future fluctuations in the market 
prices of the inputs needed to manufacture the materials the seller promised to deliver. 
Thus, it is assumed that seller’s costs, c , are drawn from a density function f( c ) with 
cumulative density function denoted F(c ) in the interval [ cc, ]. There is also uncertainty 
about the buyer’s valuation of the contract due to future fluctuations in the market prices 
of the products the buyer ultimately manufactures and sells. Thus, it is assumed that 
buyer’s valuation, v , is drawn from a density function g( v ) with cumulative density 
function denoted G(v ) in the interval [ vv, ], where G(.) and F(.) are independent 
functions. What is clear, however, is that by the time the parties’ dispute is deliberated in 
courts, call it Time 4, both parties will have learned the new market prices. The seller will 
know his costs and the buyer her valuation. The following chart presents the timeline.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Anytime after time 4.  
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1____________________2____________3________________________________4 
Parties       Seller learns    Seller signals     Buyer reports       Buyer learns   Court decides 
  enter a        his cost       anticipatory       her valuation       her valuation    and parties make 
  contract        breach       at trial      decisions 
 
Chart 1- Timeline for the model with expectation damages 
 
 
At Time 1, the seller and the buyer are symmetrically uninformed about each 
other’s as well as their own valuations. They enter a contract with a price, p . Without 
loss of generality, and for simplicity, we assume that the buyer has the entire bargaining 
power so the seller’s surplus from the contract is assumed to be zero. This entails that the 
buyer makes a take- it-or- leave- it offer of the price, p .  
We note that the price written in the contract is correlated with and reflects the 
legal regime employed by the courts that the parties are expected to face at Time 3, if the 
seller repudia tes at Time 2. Importantly, there are two legal regimes, the English Legal 
Regime (ELR) and the American Legal Regime (ALR). More on this below.  
 In the interim period between Time 1 and Time 4, both parties learn their true 
valuations but cannot make any changes to the contract between them (no renegotiation 
after Time 1). Possible justifications for the parties learning more about their true 
valuations only after Time 1 is that new information that was unknown before (but which 
was anticipated to be known later) is now revealed. For example, the seller learned his 
exact cost of performance after OPEC withdrew its threat to raise oil prices, or, the buyer 
learned that the product she intends to manufacture was approved by some federal agency 
for distribution in the US, and so forth.  
At Time 2 the seller, after learning his exact cost of performance, decides whether 
to repudiate; that is, the buyer reasonably suspects that the seller will not perform at Time 
4, as was promised. The buyer’s suspicions  could be based on a message that he received 
from the seller (such as a letter saying he would not perform in time) or due to some 
http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-lep/art15
 7 
exogenous information that has arrived (for example, that the seller has filed for 
bankruptcy).  
 
Because the goods have no readily available market price, at Time 3 the court 
hears evidence about the damages that the breach of the promise to deliver caused the 
buyer and consequently determines the amount of damages the seller needs to pay the 
buyer.  
For simplicity, we assume that only the buyer presents evidence about the loss, 
and that the seller only tries to refute the evidence. At this stage, there are two extreme 
cases of court- imposed expectation damages. One is when the court is naïve and 
completely believes what the buyer reports. That is, the buyer can totally mislead the 
court about her valuation. Denote rvˆ  ( Ar =  or E is the regime in force) as the buyer’s 
report, then in this case .ˆ rrr pvd -=
11 The other case is when the court completely 
disbelieves the buyer’s report (perhaps due to seller’s refutations), and therefore 
determines the buyer’s loss based on whatever the court can observe (which is buyer’s 
expected valuation only, i.e., .)( rr pvEd -= ).  
Of course, different courts will have different levels of naivety. To capture this 
point, we assume that courts will determine that the expectation damages lie somewhere 
in between those two cases. Thus, the court is assumed to hear the buyer’s report and, 
knowing that the buyer has an incentive to misreport the loss, the judge will also use 
his/her discretion to make some (downward) adjustments. Specifically, we assume that 
the damages will be a linear combination of the buyer’s report )ˆ( rv and the buyer’s 
(observed) expected value )(vE , i.e., rrr pvEvd --+= )()1(ˆ aa , where ]1,0[Îa  is a 
parameter representing the court’s level of “naivety.” We assume that the buyer does not 
know in advance the level of naivety of the court, and therefore cannot adapt its report to 
the specific court in which the trial takes place. Instead, we assume that the buyer can 
observe only ][aE , the average level of naivety of the court, when it decides whether and 
by how much to inflate her loss. For notational ease, we denote the bottom-line valuation 
                                                 
11 Alternatively, parties agree in Time 1 that in case of an anticipatory breach, the Buyer can submit to the 
court her valuation, which will be conclusive for the calculation of the expectation damages.  
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that the court takes into account (after accounting for buyer’s strategic behavior) when 
determining the damage award rr pvEv --+ )()1(ˆ aa  as )ˆ,(
~
rr vv a , and sometimes we 
will omit its arguments, simply denoting as rv
~ . At Time 3, based on the evidence that the 
buyer presented to the court, the court decides the amount of expectation damages that 
the breach caused. Then, after the trial, but before Time 4, the buyer learns her realized 
valuation. 
At Time 4, there are two possible regimes that the court can apply. First, an 
English Legal Regime (ELR), in which the court awards the buyer damages, Ed , for the 
anticipatory breach. Second, an American Legal Regime (ALR), in which the buyer can 
insist on getting (assurance for) specific performance over receiving damages, Ad . At 
Time 3, when the buyer makes her decisions, the seller’s realized cost of performance is 
not observable to the buyer or verifiable to the court.12 
We now compare the incentives to breach and parties’ expected payoffs under 
ELR versus under ALR.  
 
 
 
4.2 ELR with expectation damages  
When the legal regime is ELR, (that is, when the buyer is only entitled to court imposed 
expectation damages at Time 4), the buyer offers the seller in Time 1 a take- it-or- leave- it 
contract ( Ep ), where Ep , the price under ELR, is payable upon performance. The seller 
will receive cpE -  if he performs, ( Ed- ) if he breaches, where EEEE pvvd -= )ˆ,(~ a  is 
the expectation damages that the court determines based on the buyer’s evidence. 
                                                 
12 This is a major difference between our model and the models considered in the literature on incomplete 
contracts. Like other models in the literature, we assume that parties at Time 1 only observe each other‘s 
distributions. In addition to that, we also assume that parties do not know their own valuation, but rather 
have only an estimate of it. Parties in this sense are symmetrically uninformed: they both observe nothing 
but their own and each other’s distributions. No private information exists. In Time 2 asymmetry of 
information is introduced. Parties learn their own valuation but still cannot observe (and definitely not 
verify) their opponent’s valuation, only its initial distribution. Observe that our model is a sequential game. 
We believe that a sequential game more realistically captures real life situations. The results do not change 
though even if we model it as a simultaneous game. 
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Therefore, the seller will breach if )ˆ,(~ EE vvc a> . Between Time 2 and Time 3 the buyer 
chooses her report Evˆ  to maximize her expected payoff,  
).)ˆ,(~)]](ˆ,(~[1[])()][ˆ,(~[ EEEEEEEE
B
E pvvvvFpvEvvF --+-= aaap  
The first order condition (FOC) gives us the buyer’s optimal report (if 0>a ),13    
)1.4(.
)]ˆ,(~[
)]ˆ,(~[11
)(ˆ *
*
*
EE
EE
E vvf
vvF
vEv
a
a
a
-
×+=
 From (4.1), we know that ).(ˆ* vEvE >  
 
The seller’s expected payoff (if he accepts the contract) is: 
)].~()][~(1[)]~/()[~( EEEEEE
S
E pvvFvccEpvF ---+£-=p  
And the equilibrium is summarized in Lemma 5:  
Lemma 5 Under ELR with court-imposed expectation damages,                                                                              
 
.0;)()()~(
;)(;)(~
);~(/)]~(1[)()()1(ˆ~
*
~
**
~
*
~
**
****
*
**
=-=
=-=
-+=-+º
ò
òò
S
E
v
c
E
B
E
v
c
E
v
c
EE
EEEE
E
EE
ccdFvEvF
dccFddccFvp
vfvFvEvEvv
pp
aa
 
Remarks. (a) Observe that the buyer inflates her expected loss by an amount 
0
)~(
)~(11
)~( *
*
* >
-
×º
E
E
E vf
vF
v
a
d . This reflects the intuition that the buyer will try to get more 
than her expected value, which she is guaranteed even without misleading the court. By 
Assumption 1, we have 0<¢d . Equation (4.1) tells us that )]~(1/[1)]([/~ ** EE vvEv da ¢-=¶¶ . 
0<¢d  (and 0>a ) implies that )1,0()]([/~* Î¶¶ vEvE , i.e., the buyer’s value report, will 
increase in )(vE , but since ¯­Þ­Þ )~(~)( ** EE vvvE d , we know that the exaggeration 
part, )~()(ˆ ** EE vvEv d=- , will become smaller when we increase the buyer’s mean 
valuation. 
                                                 
13 If 0=a , the judge will set ),(vEd R =  and he won’t require the buyer to report her expected loss. 
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(b) Observe that the seller will breach whenever )(~* vEvc E >> . Thus, from the ex-ante 
perspective, there is under-breach relative to the social optimum. From the ex-post 
perspective, there is under-breach if *~Evv <  and over-breach if 
*~
Evv > .  
 
 
4.2 ALR with expectation damages  
 
When the legal regime is the American Legal Regime, (ALR), (that is, when the buyer 
can insist on specific performance), the buyer offers the seller at Time 1 a take-it-or-
leave- it contract ( Ap ), where Ap , the price under ALR, is payable upon performance.  If 
at Time 4 the buyer insists on delivery, she will obtain apv - ; if she agrees to the breach, 
she will get paid AAAAAA pvvpvEvd -º--+= )ˆ,(~)()1(ˆ aaa , where Ovˆ  is the buyer’s 
report at Time 3. Therefore, the buyer will insist on delivery if Avv
~³  and agree to breach 
otherwise. If the seller delivers, he will obtain cpA - . If the seller attempts to breach, his 
expected payoff will be ))](~(1[)~)(~( cpvGvpvG AAAAA --+- . Hence, the seller would 
have wanted to breach anytime Avc
~³ . 
 
The buyer chooses OAvˆ  to maximize her expected payoff , 
{ }.]))ˆ,(~/())][ˆ,(~(1[))ˆ,(~))(ˆ,(~())]ˆ,(~(1[
])())[ˆ,(~(
AAAAAAAAAAAA
AAA
B
A
pvvvvEvvGpvvvvGvvF
pvEvvF
-³-+--+
-=
aaaaa
ap
The first order condition is, 
)2.4(0)~()]~(1[)~(]~)~()([
~
=-+-ò AAAAA
v
v
vGvFvfvvGvvdG
A
).~(/)]~(1[)~(~ **** AAAA vfvFvvvEv -+£=Þ  
Comparing the buyer’s reporting strategy under the two regimes, we have the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 4  ** ˆˆ EA vv < . 
Proof: Suffices to show that ** ˆˆ EA vv <  Suppose to the contrary that .
~~ **
EA vv ³   
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From the first order conditions, we know that ),~(/)]~(1[)(~ *** EEE vfvFvEv -+= and 
).~(/)]~(1[)~(~ **** AAAA vfvFvvvEv -+£=  Hence we now have 
).~(/)]~(1[)()~(/)]~(1[)~( ***** EEAAA vfvFvEvfvFvvvE -+³-+£  However, 
)()~( * vEvvvE A <£  always holds, and by the monotone hazard rate assumption, 
** ~~
AE vv ³ )~(/)]~(1[)~(/)]~(1[
****
EEAA vfvFvfvF -£-Þ .   
Therefore, ).~(/)]~(1[)()~(/)]~(1[)~( ***** EEAAA vfvFvEvfvFvvvE -+³-+£ cannot hold. 
Thus, we have proved that  ,~~ ** EA vv <  or equivalently that 
** ˆˆ EA vv < .                                                           
QED. 
 
Remark. The ALR makes the buyer less aggressive in exaggerating her expected loss and 
misleading the court. Under ELR, the buyer inflates her expected loss trying to obtain 
more compensation in the case of a breach, because the only tool she has to affect the 
breach threshold is her report. Under ALR, besides this tool, she has the veto power; she 
can enforce the trade when her ex post valuation is very high. Therefore, she does not 
need to inflate her expected loss too much.  
 
If the seller accepts the contract, the buyer will get an expected payoff of, 
{ };])~/()][~(1[)~)(~()]~(1[])()[~( AAAAAAAAABA pvvvEvGpvvGvFpvEvF -³-+--+-=p  
and the seller’s expected payoff is 
{ }.)]~/()][~(1[)~)(~()]~(1[)]~/()[~( AAAAAAAAAASA vccEpvGvpvGvFvccEpvF ³--+--+£-=p
 
The equilibrium is summarized in the following Lemma 6:  
Lemma 6  In equilibrium, 
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).()()~()()]~(1[)()~(
;0;~
;)()~(~)~()]~(1[)(
);~(/)]~(1[)~(~
**
*
~
*
~
***
****
~
*****
****
cEccdFvGvvdGvFvEvF
pvd
ccdFvGvvGvFcEp
vfvFvvvEv
c
v
A
v
v
AA
B
A
S
AAAA
c
v
AAAAA
AAAO
AA
A
-+-+=
=-=
--+=
-+£=
òò
ò
p
p
 
 
As for the ELR regime, now we want to compare the equilibrium joint payoffs under 
different regimes with court- imposed expectation damages. The difference in equilibrium 
joint payoff is,  
ò
òòòò
òòò
òòò
-+³-³--=
---+---=
-+-+-=
---+-+=-
*
*
**
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~
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~
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~~
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~
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~
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~
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~
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)()]([)]~/()~/()][~(1)][~(1[
)(])([)(])([)())]~(1([)())]~(1([
)()()~()()]~(1[)()]~()~([
])()()~([)()()~()()]~(1[)()~(
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v
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v
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c
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E
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Lemma 7 Necessary and sufficient condition for 
** B
E
B
A pp >  is 
0)()]([)]~/()~/()][~(1)][~(1[
*
*
~
~
**** ³-+³-³-- ò
E
O
v
v
OOOO cdFvEcvccEvvvEvGvF  
 
Remark. Lemma 7 follows directly from Lemma 6. Equivalently, Lemma 7 can be 
written as:  0)()]([)()]~(1[)()]~(1[
*
***
~
~~
*
~
* ³-+--- òòò
E
OOO
v
v
c
v
O
v
v
O cdFvEcccdFvGvvdGvF  
 
Proposition 5: ALR is unconditionally better than  ELR; i.e. 
** B
E
B
A pp > . 
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Proof:  
 
NOTE: We have not been able to prove Proposition 5 analytically. Below we show 
numerically that Proposition 5 is suspected to be correct. By the time of ALEA we hope 
to either prove Proposition 5 or revise it.  
 
 
 
4.3 A simple numerical example  
 
As before the seller’s cost of production, at Time 1, is normalized to be drawn from the 
uniform distribution =)(cf  uniform [10,70]. The buyer’s best estimate of her valuation, 
at Time 1 is drawn from the uniform distribution =)(vg uniform [30,90]. Table 1 
compares the two legal regimes.  
 
Table 2- A Comparison of the Legal Regimes – expectation damages 
 
Applicable Rule *d  *p  *Bp  
*vˆ  *Sp  
ELR 20.83 39.79 20.62 60+(5/a ) 0 
ALR 17.82 38.85 22.47 60-(10/ )3( a ) 0 
 
Table 2 shows that indeed vˆ  is smaller under ALR than under ELR, which 
indicates that the buyer’s “lie” to the court at Time 3 is smaller under ALR.  Observe that 
the buyer in Time 1 can bribe the seller to agree to switch from ELR to ALR in return for 
the seller’s surrender of control over the remedy. The bribe is in the amount of the 
expectation damages clause. (Yet, the buyer pays a lower price). As can be seen, while 
maintaining the seller’s payoff as constant, the buyer’s expected payoff is increased, 
making the switch a Pareto improvement. Observe that the joint payoff is nine percent 
larger under ALR than under ELR.  
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4.3 A complicated numerical example – normal distributions.  
 
When parties’ distributions are normally distributed, analytically solving the 
model for the ELR and ALR contracts becomes much harder. We therefore solved it 
numerically. First, without loss of generality, we assumed that the buyer’s valuations are 
normally distributed with a mean of 18.5 and a standard deviation of 2.5. Second, we 
assumed that the seller’s costs are normally distributed with a relatively low mean and 
standard deviation. Without loss of generality, we assumed the seller’s mean equals 14.5 
and the standard deviation equals 1.2. Third, we calculated the price for both the ELR and 
ALR contracts only to find the joint payoff for both the ALR and the ELR contracts. 
Fourth, we plotted the difference between the joint payoffs. Fifth, we increased the 
uncertainty about the seller’s valuation (as represented by the standard deviation) by 0.2 
and performed the above routine again. We continued performing these 5 steps and 
increasing the standard deviation by 0.2 until the standard deviation was equal 4.4. 
Observe at this point that we solved the model for a seller whose mean valuation is 
relatively low, while manipulating the uncertainty about his valuation (as represented by 
the standard deviation) from a standard deviation of 1.2 (which is much lower than the 
buyer’ standard valuation) to a much larger of standard deviation of 4.4. 
 The sixth and last step was to increase the mean by 0.5 and do all the above steps 
again. Thus, in effect, we calculated the ratio of the joint payoffs under ALR and ELR for 
all iterations between the buyer and the seller, where the latter’s valuation was assumed 
to be normally distributed with a mean between 14.5 to 20 and standard variation 
between 1.2 to 4.4. Observe that we allow for the seller's mean to be higher than the 
Buyer's mean. Parties may nevertheless contract in such cases due to seller's option to 
breach. The next graphs present our results for normal distributions (which was derived 
in the way described above) and for uniform distributions (which was derived in a similar 
way):    
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As the graphs above show, for both normal and uniform distributions, the ALR is 
unconditionally better than the ELR. The intuition is that because under ALR the buyer 
has fewer incentives to mislead the court about its valuation, the efficiency loss is smaller 
compared to that in ELR.  
 
 
 
5. A model of anticipatory breach- goods with readily available price.  
 
The previous section dealt with goods that do not have readily available prices. As 
was shown, the UCC’s arrangements are unconditionally better than the arrangement in 
English law. In this section, we deal with goods that do have readily available market 
price. For these types of goods, the court does not need to rely on parties’ reports, but 
instead is assumed to be able to costlessly observe the market price for the good, and 
determine the damages accordingly.  
 
[To be completed. ] 
 
6. Extensions.  
 
In the previous sections, we presented simple models that capture the current legal 
regimes. We compare the regimes and concluded that the American Legal Regime is 
unconditionally better than the English Legal Regime. Yet, even the American regime 
does not achieve first-best allocative efficiency. The reason is simple: the buyer may 
insist on performance and thus get the goods, while the seller’s costs are ex-post higher 
than the buyer’s valuations. The question we want to explore in this section is whether a 
more sophisticated legal regime can achieve a higher allocative efficiency, perhaps even 
the first-best.  
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6.1 Two-Price Contract with Court-Imposed Expectation Damages (non-market goods) 
 
Consider the American Legal Regime with a twist to it: if the Buyer insists on 
performance, she must pay the seller the original price plus some extra. This means that 
there are two different prices in two performance scenarios. First is when the seller 
simply decides not to breach and deliver the goods. In this case he will receive the agreed 
upon price. Second is when he is forced to deliver by the buyer.  
Observe that in this two-price contract the seller might behave strategically. He 
might repudiate hoping the buyer will insist on performance and pay him a higher price. 
It is thus tempting to conclude that such a contract is less efficient. Yet, it is 
straightforward to show that the ALR two-price contract will always yield a higher joint 
payoff than the simple ALR contract. We defer this to the appendix. The intuition, 
however, is that the buyer knows the seller’s potential strategic behavior and designs the 
two prices accordingly. The buyer can always set, if she wants, the two prices to equal 
each other, which will bring her back to the simple ALR contract. If she chooses not to 
do it, it must benefit her, and thus the joint payoff.  
 
Proposition 6 A Two-Price ALR contract is Pareto superior to a simple ALR  contract 
with court-imposed expectation damages. 
 
6.2. An N-Price Contract with Court-Imposed Expectation Damages (non-market goods) 
 
Inspecting the nature of the two-price ALR contract, we find that it mimics some 
kind of ascending auction14, by further partitioning the information space over the ELR 
contract. In the ELR contract, only the seller’s information space is partitioned through 
his option-exercising behavior. In the two-price ALR contract, the seller signals his 
information through the breach decision in the first round option, then the buyer in the 
second round option signals her information through whether or not she insists on 
performance. Therefore, the two-price ALR contract is more information revealing and 
                                                 
14 But here the revenue is not going to some third party as in a standard auction, it goes to the losing bidder 
in what Ayres and Balkin called “internal” auction. 
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can lead to a more nuanced allocation. Following this logic, if we add more rounds of 
sequential options remedy to the game, the parties’ information spaces can be further 
partitioned to smaller sub-intervals, and we will have more efficient allocation. In this 
section we will demonstrate this in a uniform distribution example. We will assume that 
both the seller’s cost and the buyer’s valuation are uniformly distributed on ]1,0[ . 
 
The basic game is the following: At Time 0, the parties sign a contract to trade 
some good (or service). At Time 1, the parties learn their private valuations and decide 
whether to breach or not according to the rule they stipulated in the contract. Specifically, 
the remedy is characterized by an -n round sequential options liabilities. We will assume 
first that n  is an even number, i.e., we will have 2/n  rounds, where the prices and 
damages are different in every round. The case of n  being an odd number (the seller 
unilaterally decides whether to breach in the last round) can be analyzed in a similar way, 
which we will show later on. The parties stipulated the original price to be )(0
np . In the 
first round the seller has an option to breach by paying damages ;)(1
nd  but in the second 
round the buyer has a subsequent option to insist on performance by paying a higher 
(than original price )(0
np ) price )(1
np ; then at third round, the seller has a subsequent 
option to breach by paying a higher lever of damages ;)(2
nd at fourth round, the buyer has 
an option to insist on performance by paying an even higher price )(2
np ;……; and so on, 
until to the final round n , where the buyer can agree to breach by receiving damages 
)(
2/
n
nd , or insist on performance by paying price 
)(
2/
n
np . Basically, there are a sequence of 
call options and call-back options, where the subsequent option is actually an option to 
the option in the preceding round. We assume there is no discounting between rounds.15 
 
As before, our result is applicable to the general scenario where the parties share 
the bargaining power, for instance, the buyer receives a fraction a  ( ]1,0[Îa ) of the total 
surplus, and the seller obtains the remainder. For expositional simplicity, however, here 
we will still keep the assumption that the buyer has all bargaining power. Therefore, the 
                                                 
15 Actually, playing the game is not difficult because the game is just a simple message-exchange, which 
can be accomplished in a short time. 
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buyer will offer the seller at time 0 a take-it-or-leave- it contract 
{ }{ } )2/(,...,2,1)()()(0 ),,( nininin dpp = . Then at Time 1, after they have learned the private 
information, they will exchange the breach and insistence requests, with the 
corresponding liabilities as stipulated in the contract.  
 
As we saw from section 3.4 of two-price ALR contract, the parties will not decide 
whether to exercise their options simply based on the literal price/damage level. 
Sometimes even if they will suffer a loss from some specific round by exercising the 
option in that round, they might still do so in order to gain some profit from the 
consequent subgame. Because the price/damages are increasing every round and there is 
some probability that the other party will exercise his/her option in the next round, the 
loss in the previous round might be over-compensated in the next round. This is the 
strategic overbidding that the sequential option remedy induces. Knowing this strategic 
incentive, it will be convenient to first pin down the optimal threshold values in every 
round; whenever the party’s value is beyond the threshold value, he/she will exercise the 
option in that round. We denote )(njk  as the threshold value of round i  in an nth-order 
sequential option remedy regime, for .,...,2,1 nj =  The buyer seeks to design a sequence 
of p and the court a sequence of d s to induce the parties’ optimal option-exercising 
behavior that will maximize the joint expected surplus, i.e., designing prices and damages 
such that they will induce the strategic parties to pick the optimal threshold values in 
every round maximizing the joint surplus.  
 
Viewed through these lenses, ELR is a first-order option remedy, under which the 
seller will breach whenever his cost is beyond )1(1k . Then the buyer will induce an 
optimal )1(1k  to maximize the joint payoff, which is, 
    .2/)1()]/()()[( )1(1
)1(
1
)1(
1
)1(
1
)1( kkkccEvEkFJ -=£-=p  
The optimal 2/1
*)1(
1 =k , i.e., the buyer will set expected expectation damages. 
8/1
*)1( =pJ . 
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Two-price ALR is simply a second-order sequential option remedy, under which the 
seller will propose breach in the first round whenever his cost is beyond )2(1k ; and the 
buyer will insist on performance in the second round if her valuation is above )2(2k . The 
expected joint payoff is,  
)]./()/()][(1)][(1[)]/()2/1)[(( )2(1
)2(
2
)2(
2
)2(
1
)2(
1
)2(
1
)2( kccEkvvEkGkFkccEkFJ ³-³--+£-=p
 The optimal .27/4,3/2,3/1
*)2(*)2(
2
*)2(
1 === pJkk   
 
In the third-order sequential option remedy, there is an additional round after the buyer 
insisted on performance, in which the seller will breach if his cost is beyond )3(3k . The 
joint expected payoff is, 
   
)]./()/()][(1)][()([
)]/()2/1)[((
)3(
3
)3(
1
)3(
2
)3(
2
)3(
1
)3(
3
)3(
3
)3(
1
)3(
kckcEkvvEkGkFkF
kccEkFJ
<<-³--+
£-=p
   
The optimal .32/5,4/3,2/1,4/1
*)3(*)3(
3
*)3(
2
*)3(
1 ==== pJkkk  
 
Similarly, under an nth-order sequential option remedy regime the joint expected payoff  
(if n  is an even number) is,   
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The first-order conditions for )(nik  s give us the optimal threshold values, 
.
)1(6
)2(
;,...,2,1),1/(
2
*)(*)(
+
+
==+=
n
nn
Jnjfornjk nnj p  
Notice that the optimal threshold values are an equal-distance series, which is a particular 
result of the assumed uniform distributions. For other distributions, the series may not be 
so “well-behaved”. 
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If n  is an odd number, the expected joint payoff is,   
)];/()/()[1)((...
)]/()/()[1)(()]/()2/1[(
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kckcEkvvEkkkkccEkJ
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p
and the optimal solution is the same as when n  is an even number. 
 
It is obvious that when ,6/1,
*)( ®¥® nJn p  which is the first best joint payoff 
( ò ò =-
1
0 0
6/1)(
v
dcdvcv ). 
 
Now the question is what contract { }{ } )2/(,...,2,1)()()(0 ),,( nininin dpp =  can induce the optimal 
threshold values that the parties will take. We solve this in a kind of reverse way by 
asking what threshold values the parties will take given a contract. Given the prices and 
damages, the seller will choose threshold values ),...,,( )( 1
)(
3
)(
1
n
n
nn kkk -  to maximize his 
expected payoff, and the buyer will choose threshold values ),...,,( )()(4
)(
2
n
n
nn kkk  to 
maximize her expected payoff. 
 
By definition, at the margin of the threshold values (if the valuations are above them, 
parties will exercise the option, and will not exercise the option if values fall below the 
threshold values), the party should get the same expected payoff by not exercising the 
option as what he/she would receive by exercising the option. Given prices and damages, 
the equilibrium conditions for optimal threshold values are as follows (assuming that n  is 
an even number): 
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In any of the above equations, the left hand side is the party’s expected payoff when 
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he/she does not exercise the option; the right hand side is the party’s expected payoff 
when he/she exercises the option.  
 
Substituting the optimal threshold values, ,),...,2,1()1/(
*)( njfornjk nj =+= into 
the above equations and solving them, we get the optimal prices and damages: 
   .2/,...,2,1,)]1(3/[)2(;)]1(3/[2 )(0
*)()(
0
*)( niforpnindpnip nni
nn
i =-++=++=  
As explained before, )(0
np  as a parameter can be used to allocate the total surplus to 
individual parties according to their relative bargaining power. Here with the buyer 
having all bargaining power, the buyer will set )(0
np  such that the seller’s expected payoff 
is zero. The seller’s expected payoff is: 
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Substituting the optimal threshold values, prices, and damages into the equation, we have 
the reduced form of the seller’s equilibrium expected payoff, 
      ],)1(18/[)917187( 323)(0
*)(
++++-= nnnnp n
nSp   
therefore, under the assumption that the buyer has all bargaining power,  
].)1(18/[)917187( 323
*)(
0 ++++= nnnnp
n  
 
Therefore, the parties can sign a simple fixed-term sequential option contract, 
{ }{ } )2/(,...,2,1*)(*)(*)(0 ),,( nininin dpp = , at time 0, and it can approach first-best when we have 
sufficiently many rounds. 
 
Proposition 7 An nth-order sequential option contract and corresponding court-
determined damages as described above approaches first best efficiency when n  goes to 
infinity. 
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Remark: (1) It is well known that asymmetric information obstructs efficient trade, a la 
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983). The “impossibility theorem” is the result the difficulty 
of satisfying the ex post IR. As there is a continuum of types, there is a continuum of IR 
constraints to be satisfied, which is why it is impossible to achieve. However, our 
contract can attain first best because the parties contract ex ante, meaning the continuum 
of IR constraints is reduced to a single ex ante IR constraint in expected terms. Actually, 
as shown by D’ Aspremont, Gerard-Varet (1979), Konakayama, Mitsui and Watanabe 
(1986), and Rogerson (1992), an ex ante contract can attain first best. But those contracts, 
being contingent contracts, are not usually seen in the real world. We have shown that a 
simple fixed-term contract can approach first best with a series of sequential options, in 
the environment of two-sided asymmetric information where bargaining is difficult due 
to the rent extraction incentives and distortions from signaling.  
(2) Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) and Chung (1991), among others, demonstrated 
that a simple contract plus a renegotiation design can replicate a complex mechanism in 
inducing efficient trade and efficient investment. Their models, however, like others such 
as Hart and Moore (1988), assume that the information is observable, but not verifiable. 
Here in our model the information is not observable, but as we showed, the spirit that a 
complex mechanism can be replaced by an efficiency-equivalent simple contract still 
carries over to the environment without observable information, up to some limitation 
that the simple contract can only approach the full efficiency asymptotically. We do not 
need to take this limitation too far, because in some distributions a very limited number 
of rounds are sufficient to induce almost first best allocation. For instance, in our uniform 
example, a fourth-order contract brings a joint surplus of 4/25, which is pretty close to 
1/6.  
(3) This simple fixed-term n-round contract essentially mimics the bargaining process, 
trying to force some information revelation, and thereby to have a finer identification or 
partition of the parties’ positions. We know, however, that under asymmetric information 
bargaining often leads to multiple equilibria and inefficiencies. But our n-round contract 
is different from bargaining in several ways. Bargaining is unstructured, but our contract 
is structured ex ante; by stipulating in the contract, the parties have their option-
exercising rights at their respective rounds. A party does not need to get an agreement 
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from the other party before exercising his option, which is different from the consensual 
nature of bargaining. 
(4) Through the option-exercising behavior, the private information is revealed gradually. 
It works like an ascending auction, where the parties submit bids (prices and damages in 
our case) for the right of performance. But unlike a typical auction, here the revenue will 
not go to some third party; it will go to the losing bidder.  
 
The result can be applied to general distributions. Assuming )(~ cFc  on ],[ cc , )(~ vGv  
on ],[ vv , where F  and G  are independent and common knowledge. Then as before we 
first obtain the optimal threshold values { } ninik ,...,2,1*)( =  by maximizing the joint surplus, 
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In any round whenever a party’s valuation is above the threshold value, he/she will 
exercise the option at that round, otherwise the party will not exercise the option. 
  
Then to obtain the optimal prices and damages, we will suppose prices and damages are 
given and the parties maximize their individual payoffs by choosing optimal threshold  
values. These marginal conditions will give us a group of equations linking the threshold 
values and prices/damages; then by substituting the optimal threshold values in, we have 
the optimal prices/damages. 
 
6.3 Continuous Case and Implementation 
 
For general distribution we can show that more rounds are better than less rounds, 
because with more rounds, more information will be revealed through the option 
exercising decisions. Thus, the allocative inefficiencies can be reduced.  
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Though the n-round sequential option remedy effectively allows the contract to approach 
first-best, some may claim that too many rounds are involved. But, it is actually a simple 
message-exchange game. Interestingly, recently we found Knysh, Goldbart and Ayres 
(2004) are extending the higher-order liability rules to the continuous cases in a nuisance 
setting. As they observed, many intermediate steps are not necessary for this liability to 
work. In a continuous setting, all n  rounds can be reduced to a one-shot auction, where 
the parties submitted their maximum bids ),( BS bb  for the entitlement, and the court will 
allocate the entitlement to the highest bidder, asking him to pay the loser damages which 
are functions of the submitted bids ( )(),( SB bdbp ). They show that for general 
distributions with arbitrary correlations, a class of mechanisms ))(),(,( SB bdbpA  with A  
being any constant ( A can be used for distributing the total payoff to the individual party, 
like an up-front transfer) can achieve first-best, and it is incentive compatible, i.e., the 
parties will submit their true values. 
 
Their result is very interesting for its generality (Hermalin and Katz (1993)’s “fill- in-the-
price” mechanism doesn’t work for imperfectly correlated distributions) and the ease 
with which it can be implemented; however, as they admitted, their result is not a 
challenge to Myerson and Satterthaite (1983), in that they simply dropped the IR 
constraint from the analysis by assuming that the parties are already in the game. Given 
that the parties are already in this game, their mechanism (we will call it KGA 
hereinafter) is first-best. However, the parties may choose not to participate in this game 
in the first place. But in our ex ante contracting environment, we can use KGA to 
implement an n-round sequential option contract in a one-shot auction, in which it can 
attain first-best efficiency, and is incentive compatible and individually rational. The key 
is that one single parameter A  is not sufficient to satisfy a continuum of ex post IR 
constraints, but it is sufficient to satisfy a single ex ante IR constraint.  
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Proposition 8 Through instantaneous liability rule auction, we can achieve first-best 
with IR, IC satisfied. 
Proof: The parties sign a KGA contract ))(),(,( SB bdbpA  ex ante, in which each party 
will submit a bid b  to the court after he/she learned his/her valuations.  Then by KGA, it 
will be incentive compatible and first-best efficient. Denoting a buyer of type v ’s ex post 
payoff excluding the constant A  from the KGA contract as )(vBp ; similarly, a seller of 
type c ’s ex post payoff excluding the constant A  from the KGA contract as )(cSp . 
Then A  such that 0)()( =+ ò
c
c
S cdFcA p  will make the contract satisfying IR, because ex 
post the buyer will receive a payoff of AvB -)(p , while the seller will receive a payoff of 
AcS +)(p .  It satisfies ex post collective IR, which is ;0)()( ³+=å cv SB ppp   
the buyer’s ex ante payoff is 
.0)()()()()()()()( ³=+=- ò òåòòò cdFvdGcdFcvdGvAvdGv
v
v
c
c
c
c
S
v
v
B
v
v
B pppp              QED. 
 
Remark: D’ Aspremont, and Gerard-Varet (1979), Konokayama, Mitsui and Watanabe 
(1986), and Rogerson (1992) also can implement the continuous solution for uncorrelated 
distributions. KGA, however, showed that the first best can be achieved for very general 
correlated distributions with infinitely many rounds (almost continuous) of options. 
Actually, at the interim stage with parties having asymmetric information before 
bargaining as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), and McAfee and Reny (1992) have 
shown that even a very small correlation between the parties’ values can eliminate the 
informational rent, and thus restore the first-best efficiency. 
 
 
 
7. Summary and Future Research  
[To be completed. ] 
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7. Appendix  
 [To be Completed] 
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